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Abstract
A widely used clause in license contracts – the field-of-use restriction (FOUR) –
precludes licensees from operating outside of the specified technical field. When a
technology has several distinct applications, FOUR allow the licensor to slice up his
rights and attribute them to the lowest-cost producer in each field of use. This can
improve production efficiency. However, with complex technologies, the boundaries
of fields of use may be difficult to codify, entailing a risk of overlap of licensees’
rights. We explore how this affects the optimal license contract in a moral hazard
framework where the licensor’s effort determines the probability of overlap. We show
that depending on the contracting environment, the license agreement may include
output restrictions and nonlinear royalty schemes.
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1 Introduction
Field-of-use restrictions (henceforth, FOUR) are clauses that preclude licensees from using
the licensed technology in fields other than those specified in the license contract. For
example, if a firm patents a new touch-screen technology, it could give an exclusive license
to one firm for use of the technology in mobile phones, and exclusively license another
firm for use in PDAs. The firms would be prohibited from marketing products using the
licensed technology outside of their respective fields. Several empirical studies have found
this sort of usage restriction to be extremely common.1 Nevertheless, their impact on
licensing contracts has been left largely unexplored by economists.2 This is somewhat
surprising since practitioners’ comments suggest that with complex technologies, fields of
use may often be difficult to separate. The licensor must be very careful and may have to
exert considerable effort in drafting the field-of-use clauses in order to avoid that licensees’
rights overlap. Moreover, overlap may not always be discernible for a court of justice.
To go back to the example mentioned above, if the mobile phone company introduces a
new phone that includes an organizer function, and the PDA manufacturer launches a
new model that allows sending text messages to mobile phones, are they violating the
field-of-use restrictions? Under these circumstances, the risk of overlap can have profound
implications for the design of license contracts, a fact that the economics literature has
ignored so far.
This paper takes a first step towards closing this gap. We look at one particular situation
where FOUR arise quite naturally: when a patent holder’s technology has several different
1 Caves et al. (1983) survey 22 licensors and 34 licensees from the United States, Canada and the
United Kingdom. They find that 34 percent of the license agreements in their sample include “market
restrictions”, that is, restrictions preventing the licensee from selling outside certain specified markets (no
distinction is made between territorial and field-of-use restrictions). Anand and Khanna (2000) conduct
a large-scale inter-industry study of licensing behavior. Their sample consists of 1365 licensing deals
involving at least one US corporation, as documented by the Securities Data Company. 37 percent of the
agreements in their sample are identified as incorporating temporal, product or geographic restrictions,
but again no distinction is made between the types of restriction. Anand and Khanna (2000) argue
that this figure probably underestimates the actual frequency of such restrictions, because they are not
always divulged in public announcements. Bessy and Brousseau (1998) compile a sample of 46 licensing
agreements through a survey of French firms. They find that 87 percent of license contracts include some
form of usage restriction. Contrary to the first two studies, they distinguish among the different types of
restrictions. While geographical restrictions are the most common (58.7 percent), clauses limiting the field
of application also turn out to be pervasive. They appear in 50 percent of the licences in the sample.
2 From an antitrust perspective, usage restrictions are generally considered benign (see, e.g., the An-
titrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property issued by the US Department of Justice and
the Federal Trade Commission in 1995, and Gilbert and Shapiro (1997)).
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applications, and different firms are specialized in each of the possible fields of use. Then,
production efficiency requires that the lowest-cost firm in each field of use get an exclusive
license for that field. Since ex ante, the contracting parties want to maximize the size of the
pie, they will agree to slice up the patent holder’s rights. The risk of overlap, however, may
constrain them in their ability to achieve the efficient outcome. We look at a very simple
setup with two symmetric applications of the licensor’s technology, and two licensees, each
of whom is specialized (i.e., has a competitive advantage in terms of production costs)
in one of the fields of use. The licensor’s level of care in drafting the field-of-use clauses
determines the probability of overlap, and writing a precise contract is costly. If there is
no overlap, both licensees are monopolists in their respective field of use. By contrast,
in the event of overlap, each of them can produce in both fields of use. We assume that
they compete in quantities, so that the equilibrium is asymmetric Cournot.3 Since the
industry’s production technology is inefficient under duopoly (high-cost firms contribute
to production in equilibrium), overlap reduces joint profits.
We consider three different contracting environments which differ in their degree of
“completeness”. In the first, overlap can be included as a contingency in the contract.
That is, courts can observe whether each licensee has exclusivity. This implies that royalty
payments can depend on whether or not there is overlap. In the second, overlap is noncon-
tractible,4,5 but the licensor’s effort – and thus the probability of overlap – is observable to
the licensees. In the third, overlap is noncontractible and effort is unobservable.
We derive the optimal contract in each of those environments, without imposing any
ad-hoc restriction on the permissible royalty schemes, except that they can depend only
on each licensee’s total quantity. That is, we take a mechanism design approach and look
for the feasible quantity-transfer pairs that maximize the licensor’s payoff, but we restrict
attention to a simple class of mechanisms: the licensor is limited to proposing a menu
of contracts and cannot play any more sophisticated message game. From the resulting
3 The asymmetry is due to the assumption that firm i has a lower marginal cost of producing in field
of use i than firm j.
4 The environments we consider – overlap being perfectly contractible, or not at all – clearly are polar
cases. In reality, courts may sometimes find breach of contract when fields of use overlap, and sometimes
not. “Contractibility” would thus be probabilistic.
5 The environment where parties do not include overlap as a contingency could also be interpreted as a
shortcut to account for the issues raised in Spier (1992), where contracts are strategically left incomplete
by the principal in order to signal his type. In the current context, a clause specifying what happens in
the event of overlap might be bad news about the licensor’s ability to separate fields of use.
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quantity-transfer pairs, we deduce the optimal royalty scheme.
When overlap is contractible, the license agreement consists of a fixed fee equal to the
licensees’ expected profit given the equilibrium level of effort (the licensor is assumed to
have all the bargaining power and thus extracts the entire surplus), as well as an output
restriction and a penalty imposed on the licensor, both of which apply only in case of
overlap. The optimization problem can be decomposed into two steps: first, the royalty
scheme is chosen so as to maximize joint surplus given the realization of overlap. When
there is no overlap, the optimal scheme is no royalty since royalties distort the licensees’
production decision (this is the standard double marginalization argument). When there
is overlap, the royalty scheme is used to soften competition between licensees. One way
of doing this is to impose a quantity restriction that is chosen so as to maximize industry
profits subject to the licensees’ optimizing behavior. Second, the penalty is set so as to
induce the licensor to exert the efficient level of effort given the difference between overlap
and no-overlap profits. The optimal penalty is equal to the marginal cost of effort evaluated
at the efficient level.
When overlap is noncontractible but effort is observable, the royalty scheme can no
longer be conditioned on the realization of overlap. The contract must now satisfy incen-
tive compatibility (IC) constraints. We show that implementability requires that licensees
produce more under duopoly (overlap) than under monopoly (no overlap). That is, there
is a conflict between incentive compatibility and efficiency (which requires that licensees
produce less in case of overlap) which is known as nonresponsiveness (Guesnerie and Laf-
font, 1984). Accordingly, a balance needs to be struck between softening competition in
case of duopoly and avoiding distortions in case of monopoly. At the same time, there is no
moral hazard problem, so that the royalty scheme can be designed with the sole objective
of maximizing expected industry profits. The optimal royalty scheme then reduces to an
output restriction (quantity rationing). The restriction is typically below the monopoly
quantity. Costly effort to separate fields of use is always exerted.
When effort is unobservable, the royalty scheme has to accomplish an additional func-
tion on top of the previous one: Incentivizing the licensor to take the appropriate care in
drafting the field-of-use clauses. In fact, the patent holder has no incentive to exert effort
unless his royalty income depends positively on effort. Notice first that this means that ef-
fort is incompatible with the quantity rationing scheme that is optimal under observability.
Of course, the licensees will anticipate this and would be willing to pay only their expected
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profit given the minimum level of effort to obtain a license if they were offered such a
scheme. Second, recall that whatever the royalty scheme, monopoly output cannot exceed
duopoly output. Hence, a royalty scheme that induces effort must be such that output in
case of overlap is strictly greater than in the no-overlap case. Third, the royalty payment
associated with the no-overlap quantity must exceed the payment in case of overlap. This
implies that in the no-overlap case, licensees will have an incentive to produce more than
the monopoly quantity in order to pay lower royalties. Solving for the optimal contract,
we find that under some conditions, the resulting royalty scheme is no longer trivial and
features royalties that are decreasing with output over some range. We identify a tradeoff
between providing incentives to the licensor and producing at the efficient scale. While
raising the duopoly quantity relaxes the IC and thereby induces greater effort, it also moves
duopoly output away from the efficient level. We show that this can be optimal when the
cost of effort is sufficiently convex; otherwise, a nonexclusive license to both firms prevails.
Related literature This paper is related to two separate strands of literature: The lit-
erature on licensing, and particularly on the role of royalties in license agreements, and
the literature on vertical restraints, specifically territorial restrictions. Much of the lit-
erature on licensing has been concerned with explaining the widespread use of royalties
in practice, as documented by, e.g., Taylor and Silberston (1973), Contractor (1981) and
Rostoker (1984), which contrasts with the theoretical finding that in a standard setup
with risk-neutral firms and symmetric information, royalties are undesirable. This result
was first established in the context of a (cost-reducing) process innovation by Kamien and
Tauman (1986) who showed that fixed fees dominate royalties for a patentee who licenses
to a Cournot oligopoly.6 Meanwhile, in the context of product innovations, when the in-
ventor is unable to work the patent himself, it is generally optimal to give exclusive rights
to a single licensee.7 As we know from the literature on vertical control, due to the issue
of double marginalization (Spengler, 1950), the licensor should then set royalties to zero
(i.e., marginal cost) and extract the surplus through a fixed fee. Since the early nineties,
scholars have turned their attention to the conflict between theoretical predictions and the
6 Katz and Shapiro (1986) show that auctioning off a fixed number of licenses, strictly below the total
number of firms in the industry, does even better than a simple fixed fee; see Kamien (1992) for a survey
of the literature on licensing of cost-reducing innovations.
7 The argument that is sometimes made according to which, in the presence of increasing marginal
costs of production, it can be optimal to license several firms seems unconvincing since a single firm should
be able to replicate what several firms are doing, for instance by setting up several production plants.
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available empirical evidence. Among the explanations for the use of royalties that have
been put forward are adverse selection (Gallini and Wright, 1990; Beggs, 1992), moral haz-
ard (Choi, 2001) and risk aversion (Bousquet et al., 1998). This paper offers an alternative
rationale for royalties which is based on the possibility that licensees’ fields of use may
overlap, meaning that the licensor needs to be given incentives to take the appropriate
level of care in drafting the license contract.
The vertical control literature has looked for conditions under which an upstream firm
with market power will find it optimal to impose various kinds of vertical restraints on
downstream firms, one of which are territorial restrictions.8 Among the results that have
been established is that, when retailers provide pre-sale services (such as advertising or con-
sumer information) which have public-good aspects, competition will lead to free riding,
a problem that can be solved by establishing local monopolies (Mathewson and Winter,
1984). When there is uncertainty on demand and/or cost parameters and retailers are
better informed than the manufacturer, exclusive territories make better use of the retail-
ers’ information than retail competition since the latter drives market prices down to the
wholesale price (Rey and Tirole, 1986). This literature generally assumes that downstream
firms are identical (so that there is no reason in terms of cost efficiency for exclusive terri-
tories) and that defining (and enforcing) territorial restrictions is costless. Our approach is
different in that we adopt a setup where there are natural advantages to exclusivity because
there is a single most efficient firm in each field. However, carelessness in the definition of
fields may lead to overlapping rights. We investigate how the risk of overlap affects the
desirability of field-of-use restrictions. While we focus on technical fields, our analysis may
also apply to geographical territories in some cases: Retailers with a lot of experience in
selling in a particular geographical region may have advantages over competitors who lack
knowledge of local characteristics, and territories may sometimes have to be appropriately
defined to avoid ambiguity. A recent decision by the French supreme court is a case in
point: Overturning the decision of an appeals court, the judges ruled that a manufacturer
who had granted an exclusive territory to a retailer did not violate the contract by also
offering his products through the internet.9
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the setup of
8 See Katz (1989) and Rey and Verge´ (2007) for an overview of the economics of vertical restraints.
9 Cour de Cassation, Chambre Commerciale, March 14, 2006 - N◦ du pourvoi: 03-14639, see http:
//www.legalis.net/jurisprudence-decision.php3?id article=1602 (in French).
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the model. Section 3 derives the optimal license contract in each of the three contracting
environments we consider. Finally, in section 4, we highlight some empirical predictions
that follow from our results, and briefly discuss implications for antitrust authorities.
2 A model with two licensees
Consider the following setup. A patent holder (P ) wants to license his patented technology
in two fields of use (1 and 2) where other firms have cost advantages.10 Both fields of use
are equally profitable. It is common knowledge that firm L1 is the lowest-cost producer
of application 1 and firm L2 the low-cost producer of application 2. Denoting by cij the
constant unit cost of production of application j by licensee i, we have cii < cij for i = 1, 2
and j 6= i. Assume for simplicity that cii = cL and cij = cH , and denote ∆c ≡ cH − cL the
difference in costs. If drafting a contract that clearly separates the licensees’ fields of use
were costless, it would thus be optimal (i.e., maximize joint profits) to give L1 an exclusive
license restricted to field 1 in exchange for a fixed upfront payment, and analogously for L2
in field of use 2. Royalties should not be used since, by distorting licensees’ decisions, they
decrease joint profits. Similarly, no restrictions on licensees’ output should be imposed by
the licensor.
However, we will assume that precise drafting is costly for the patent holder, and that
the precision of the contractual language affects the probability of overlap. Let e be the
effort exerted by P when writing the field-of-use clauses. Effort is chosen in the interval
[0, 1]. The cost of effort is ψ(e), increasing and convex, with ψ(0) = ψ′(0) = 0. With
probability 1− e, the fields of use are so broadly defined that they turn out to overlap. If
there is overlap, each firm can produce in both fields of use. Thus, in particular, zero effort
corresponds to the case of a nonexclusive license to all fields of use for both firms.
The effort variable e can be interpreted in several ways, with different implications
in terms of its observability for licensees. Assume there is a list of attributes on which
fields could differ (this list could be large – possibly infinite, and include things such as
size, color, materials used, . . . ). Only a few (possibly a single one) of them are relevant
for cleanly defining the boundary between the two fields. Effort could consist in the time
10 We assume that the technology adds sufficient value to existing products to create a completely new
market, rather than merely reducing costs. Much of the licensing literature has dealt with cost-reducing
innovation, for which it is generally optimal to license many firms (at least for non-drastic innovations).
For the purposes of this paper, however, a framework where there are advantages to exclusivity is needed.
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and money spent to find out the relevant attributes. Alternatively, effort might be the
number of attributes included in the contract (as opposed to those that are left out), in
a setting where adding a contingency to the contract is costly, as in Dye (1985) or Bajari
and Tadelis (2001). In the former case, effort is observable if licensees can check which
amount the licensor has invested, and unobservable otherwise. In the latter case, effort
is observable if there is a finite number of attributes, so that the number of attributes
included in the contract is a sufficient statistic for effort, and unobservable if there is an
infinity of attributes, rendering the number in the contract meaningless. In section 3, we
consider both the case where effort is observable and the case where it is unobservable.
Since we will consider the question of whether the use of a royalty can be beneficial when
there is some probability of overlap, we have to make assumptions on the observability and
verifiability of some other variables. We start by clarifying our notion of overlap. When
fields of use overlap, we hold that the descriptions in the field-of-use clauses do not allow
a court to establish whether a device produced under the terms of the license is destined
for field 1 or 2. This seems natural since it is precisely the object of the contract to define
what the fields of use are. Overlap corresponds to the case where the licensor has failed
to draw a clear boundary. Thus, a court may be able to rule whether licenses overlap11
– whether each licensee indeed has exclusivity in his field of use, or whether the licenses
are so broad that each licensee can produce in both fields, thus violating exclusivity – but
when the licenses turn out to overlap, the court generally cannot guess what the parties’
original intention was – which field to attribute exclusively to who. Accordingly, letting
qij denote Li’s output in field of use j, the contract can depend only on the total output
of each licensee (that is, qii + qij) and not on qij individually.
We assume that total output by each firm is observable and contractible. Effectively,
this means we assume that courts can verify whether the terms of the license cover the
products produced by the licensees, and thus – among other things – whether royalty
payments are due. Prices are unobservable to the licensor. Royalties cannot depend on
the other firm’s output. Apart from this, any royalty scheme (linear or nonlinear) that
depends only on output is possible.
The timing is as follows (see figure 1): at date 0, the contract is drafted by P who
chooses a level of care e. The contract specifies a fixed upfront payment F and a royalty
scheme R(q) (i.e., R(q) is the royalty payment associated with an output of q units of a
11 The possibility of using the event of overlap itself as a contingency is discussed in the following section.
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product that uses the licensed technology). L1 and L2 accept or reject the contract.
12 If
the contracts are accepted, each pays the fixed fee to the patent holder. At date 1, the
licensees learn whether their license permits them to enter the competitor’s field of use.
Finally, at date 2, firms produce. If there is no overlap, they are monopolists, otherwise
they compete in both fields of use. The discount factor is assumed equal to 1.
- time
t = 0
P drafts
contract:
chooses
e, F , R(q)
L1 and L2
accept or reject
If accept: pay F
If reject:
game ends
Overlap realized
Production:
L1 and L2 choose
qii and qij , pay R(q)
t = 1 t = 2
Figure 1: Timing of the game
If there is overlap, firms compete a` la Cournot.13 Inverse demand functions are identical
and given by p(q) = a− q where q is the total quantity sold in a given field. That is, if Li
sells qii and Lj sells qji in market i, inverse demand is a− qii − qji.14
12 We assume that the contract offers are public. The literature on vertical control has sometimes
used public contracts (see, e.g., Mathewson and Winter, 1984), and at other times secret contracts (see,
e.g., Hart and Tirole, 1990). The issue that arises with secret offers in the context of licensing is one of
commitment: while ex ante, the patent holder would like to commit himself, for instance, to license only
one firm, once the contract is signed he is tempted to hand out additional licenses, eventually leading to
a flooding of the market which erodes profits (Rey and Tirole, 2007). This is an example of contracting
with externalities; see Segal (1999) for an excellent synthesis of many existing models which exhibit this
feature. While an exclusivity clause may solve the problem in the particular example mentioned above,
the issue is in fact much more general. In this paper, we abstract from the complexities that result from
secret contract offers and focus on public offers.
13 When firms compete a` la Bertrand and their only strategic variable is price, P can use a simple royalty
scheme such as a unit royalty, set the royalty rate such that the duopoly quantity is exactly equal to the
monopoly quantity at a zero royalty, and choose e = 0, thereby achieving the most desired (joint profit
maximizing) outcome. There is no inefficiency since, under price competition with asymmetric costs, the
high-cost firm’s output is zero. Hence, in that extreme case there is no reason for the use of FOUR.
14 This setup – Cournot competition with linear demand – has been widely used in the economic analysis
of licensing.
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3 The optimal design of the license contract
We will consider several scenarios concerning the verifiability of overlap and observability
of effort. To establish a benchmark, we will derive the contract that would obtain if
overlap were contractible.15 It is likely, though, that the event of overlap is not a perfectly
contractible variable.16 In practice, P can perhaps be held responsible for careless drafting
(overlap amounts to a breach of contract since licensees do not get the exclusivity they
signed up for), but whether a court will actually find him liable is uncertain at best.
Therefore, we will proceed to consider the other polar case where overlap is noncontractible.
In a first step, we examine what the optimal contract is when licensees observe the amount
of effort that P invests in the definition (and clean separation) of fields of use. In a second
step, we investigate the opposite case where licensees do not observe e, so that a moral
hazard problem arises. To summarize, in what follows we study the optimal license contract
in three different contracting environments: (1) when overlap is contractible, (2) when
overlap is noncontractible and effort is observable, and (3) when overlap is noncontractible
and effort is unobservable.
Throughout the paper, we will take a mechanism design approach to the problem. That
is, we look for pairs of quantities and associated royalty payments for each state of nature
(overlap and exclusivity) which are uniquely implementable in Nash equilibrium, and from
this set, we choose the ones that maximize the licensor’s expected profit.17 The resulting
“dots” in the quantity-royalty space allow us to deduce the features of an optimal royalty
scheme. We denote the state of nature by s ∈ {m, d} where m (monopoly) corresponds
to exclusivity and d (duopoly) corresponds to overlap, and the associated quantities and
royalty payments by q(s) and r(s), respectively.
3.1 Benchmark: contracting on overlap is possible
This section derives a sort of “first best” solution that obtains if the contract can be
contingent on the state of nature s (i.e., on overlap). We will deal with the case where effort
15 If it may seem implausible that real-world contracts would actually be contingent on overlap, it is
interesting to note that they sometimes are: for an example of a license agreement which includes an
overlap clause from the SEC info database, see http://www.secinfo.com/dRqWm.8vWq.a.htm.
16 Meanwhile, note that making the contract contingent on there being competition may be impractical
because it is hard to establish that firms are actually competing with each other.
17 As stated in the introduction and explained in more detail below, there is one qualification: we will
restrict the available mechanisms to the simple class of incentive compatible contracts.
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is observable first before considering the more general case where effort is unobservable.
Since parties are risk neutral, the efficient solution will be attained regardless of whether
effort is observable, so that the second part merely consists in finding a way to implement
the efficient level of effort.
With contractible overlap and observable effort, the licensor’s problem is
max
e;{Fi}i=1,2;{(qi(m),ri(m));(qi(d),ri(d))}i=1,2
∑
i
Fi + e
∑
i
ri(m) + (1− e)
∑
i
ri(d)− ψ(e)
subject to Fi ≤ e
[
Πm
(
qi(m)
)− ri(m)]+ (1− e)[Πd(qi(d), qj(d))− ri(d)], i = 1, 2; j 6= i
where Πs(·) is the equilibrium (gross of royalty) profit attained by a licensee given the
market structure s and each firm’s total output (this will be defined more precisely below).
Notice that, consistent with the assumption that the royalty scheme cannot depend on qij
in case of overlap, the mechanism only specifies a total quantity qi(d) = qii + qij.
Since the licensor makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer, he will choose F as large as possible;
hence, the constraint must be binding at the optimum. The problem becomes
max
e;{(qi(m),ri(m));(qi(d),ri(d))}i=1,2
e
∑
i
Πm
(
qi(m)
)
+ (1− e)
∑
i
Πd
(
qi(d), qj(d)
)− ψ(e). (1)
Clearly, the choice of quantities is independent of e, so the problem of finding the optimal
license contract can be decomposed into two steps: First, determining the optimal quantity
for any given realization of overlap, and deducing the royalty scheme that achieves it (note
that since the event of overlap can be included as a contingency in the contract, the royalty
scheme can depend on its realization so that there can be two different royalty schemes
Rm(·) and Rd(·)); second, finding the level of effort that maximizes expected joint profit
given the difference between licensee profits in the overlap and no-overlap cases. Note also
that, since P can extract the licensees’ profit through the fixed fee, the levels of royalty
payments, r(m) and r(d), are irrelevant. The use of a royalty will be motivated solely by
the desire to influence the licensees’ decisions.
No overlap: monopoly. When both fields of use are cleanly separated, each licensee is
a monopolist in his market. Each licensee’s monopoly profit as a function of quantity q is
Πm(q) = [a− q − cL]q. (2)
The profit-maximizing quantity is q∗m =
a−cL
2
. It is obvious from (1) that the mechanism
should implement qi(m) = q
∗
m ∀i.
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Thus, any royalty scheme that induces the licensee to produce the monopoly quantity
q∗m is a solution. One particular solution that stands out for its simplicity is no royalty
at all, Rm(q) = 0 ∀q. This is the standard double marginalization argument (Spengler,
1950): in a vertical relationship, the upstream firm should charge a price to the downstream
firm that equals the marginal cost of the input supplied, and extract the surplus through
a fixed upfront payment. Here, the input is simply information (technological knowledge),
which has zero marginal cost, so that the optimal price is zero too.
Overlap: duopoly. When fields of use overlap, both licenses are effectively nonexclusive:
licensee Li faces competition in field i from (less efficient) licensee Lj and vice versa. While
in the case of monopoly, royalties are undesirable because they create a distortion, in the
duopoly case royalties can be useful as a means of softening competition. We will proceed as
follows: first, we derive licensees’ equilibrium behavior given that each of them is required to
produce a total quantity qi(d); second, we determine the quantity that maximizes industry
profit subject to the licensees’ optimizing behavior; third, we deduce the R that achieves
those quantities.
To begin, we make an assumption on cH .
Assumption 1 The inefficient firm’s marginal cost satisfies cH <
a+ cL
2
.
In words, cH must be lower than the monopoly price that would prevail without royal-
ties. This assumption makes sure that Li enters field of use j in the absence of a royalty,
i.e., that in case of overlap, licensees are actually a threat to each other.
Since, by assumption, the firms compete in quantities, Li maximizes over qii and qij
max
qii,qij
[a− qii − qji − cL]qii + [a− qjj − qij − cH ]qij subject to qii + qij = qi(d) (3)
while taking qji and qjj as given. The following lemma characterizes the equilibrium values
of qii and qij.
Lemma 1 Let qi(d) be the total quantity that licensee i should produce in case of overlap.
If qi(d) ≥ ∆c and qj(d) ≥ ∆c, the Cournot-Nash equilibrium of the game has
qii =
qi(d) + ∆c
2
qij =
qi(d)−∆c
2
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for all i, j 6= i and for any qj(d) ≥ ∆c.
If qi(d) ≥ ∆c and qj(d) < ∆c, the equilibrium is
qii =
2qi(d) + qj(d) + ∆c
4
qij =
2qi(d)− qj(d)−∆c
4
qjj = qj(d)
qji = 0.
Finally, if qi(d) < ∆c and qj(d) < ∆c, the equilibrium has
qii = qi(d)
qij = 0
for all i, j 6= i and for any 0 ≤ qj(d) < ∆c.
Proof: Rewriting (3) using qi(d) in the constraint and taking into account that Lj faces
an analogous problem so that qji = qj(d)− qjj, Li’s problem becomes
max
qii
[a− qii − (qj(d)− qjj)− cL]qii + [a− qjj − (qi(d)− qii)− cH ](qi(d)− qii).
The first-order condition of the problem is
a− 2qii − qj(d) + qjj − cL = a− qjj − 2(qi(d)− qii)− cH .
Solving for qii and replacing qjj from the first-order condition of Lj’s problem, we obtain
qii =
∆c− qj(d) + 2qi(d) + [∆c− qi(d) + 2qii + 2qj(d)]/2
4
,
which can be solved for the equilibrium qii which, in turn, can be replaced in the constraint
to obtain qij, yielding the expressions claimed in the first part of the lemma (for the case
where qi(d) > ∆c for all i). These are valid solutions as long as qij ≥ 0 for all i which is
the case as long as qi(d) ≥ ∆c. When qi(d) < ∆c, Li’s output in field j, qij, is zero, while
qii = qi(d). Modifying the first-order condition accordingly yields the second part of the
lemma. 
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Thus, the difficulty for the licensor is that he can only control the total quantity pro-
duced by each licensee. He can hardly influence the distribution of output between the
two fields of use – except when the total quantity is so restrictive as to deter a licensee
from entering his competitor’s market altogether. Otherwise, the Cournot-Nash equilib-
rium has each licensee producing in both fields of use, with the share of the more efficient
firm determined by the difference in marginal costs. The consequence of this is that, in
equilibrium, some of the units sold are generally contributed by high-cost producers, mak-
ing the industry’s production technology inefficient. The licensor will optimally react to
this by inducing less than monopoly output.
Note also that Lemma 1 implies that it can never be optimal for the licensor to choose a
quantity qi(d) that is strictly below ∆c. For any given total output such that qi(d)+qj(d) ≥
2∆c, the proportion that is produced at low cost (cL) is always greater if each licensee
produces at least ∆c. Moreover, as long as qi(d) ≥ ∆c for all i, all that matters for
industry profits is aggregate output, qi(d) + qj(d), and not how it is shared between the
licensees. Therefore, we will from now on suppose that the licensor treats both licensees
symmetrically, so that qi(d) = qj(d) = q(d), which greatly simplifies notation.
Formally, the licensor’s problem then is to choose q(d) so as to
max
q(d)
[a− q(d)]q(d)− cL min{q(d), (q(d) + ∆c)/2} − cH max{0, (q(d)−∆c)/2}. (4)
The next lemma describes the solution to this problem.
Lemma 2 If cH ≤ (2a + 3cL)/5, the quantity q∗d that maximizes industry profits is given
by
q∗d =
a− (cL + cH)/2
2
and both firms contribute to production with qii = (2a−5cL+3cH)/8 and qij = (2a−5cH +
3cL)/8 for all i.
If cH > (2a + 3cL)/5, only the low-cost producer is active, i.e. qij = 0, and q
∗
d = ∆c.
In both cases, the aggregate output is lower than the monopoly quantity: q∗d < q
∗
m.
Proof: The optimization program
max
q
[a− q]q − cL q + ∆c
2
− cH q −∆c
2
14
leads to the first-order condition a − 2q − (cL + cH)/2 = 0, the solution of which is q∗d =
a−(cL+cH)/2
2
. This is a valid solution to (4) as long as it is greater than ∆c, that is
a− (cL + cH)/2
2
≥ ∆c⇔ cH ≤ (2a+ 3cL)/5.
One can then determine qii and qij using Lemma 1. If cH > (2a + 3cL)/5, we have
a corner solution so that the second part of Lemma 2 applies. As for the last claim,
a−(cL+cH)/2
2
< a−cL
2
since cH > cL, while ∆c <
a−cL
2
follows from Assumption 1. 
In order to limit the damage caused by overlap, there are two possibilities. One can
shut down the inefficient firm by reducing output to ∆c. Alternatively, one can be less
restrictive but at the expense of involving the inefficient firm in production. The intuition
for Lemma 2 is that, when cH is low, one needs to sacrifice a lot of output to deter the
high-cost firm from entering, while at the same time the loss in production efficiency from
involving it is not too important. Therefore, it is optimal to allow both firms to be active,
albeit at an aggregate level of activity that is below q∗m. By contrast, when cH is high,
having the high-cost firm contribute to production is very inefficient, and at the same time
it is not too costly to exclude it. Therefore, restricting output to ∆c is optimal. Figure 2
below illustrates the case where cH < (2a + 3cL)/5 so that letting both firms produce is
optimal. qCd denotes the Cournot duopoly output in the absence of royalties.
There are many royalty schemes that allow the licensor to implement q(d) = q∗d. The
simplest is a quantity restriction that limits output to q∗d, that is,
Rd(q) =
{
0 for q ≤ q∗d
∞ for q > q∗d.
He can also use a unit royalty, Rd(q) = ρq with
ρ =
{
a−(cH+cL)/2
4
for cH < (2a+ 3cL)/5
a− 2cH + cL for cH ≥ (2a+ 3cL)/5.
The licensor’s effort choice. When effort is observable, the licensor chooses his level
of care so as to maximize expected profits. In the preceding analysis, we have derived
the optimal quantity for each realization of overlap; let the associated levels of (gross of
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Figure 2: Licensees’ profits with and without overlap
royalty) profit be pi∗m ≡ [a−q∗m−cL]q∗m and pi∗d ≡ [a−q∗d]q∗d−cL(q∗d+∆c)/2−cH(q∗d−∆c)/2.18
The licensor’s choice of e then simply maximizes
epi∗m + (1− e)pi∗d − ψ(e)/2. (5)
When effort is unobservable, the licensor needs to be given incentives to actually choose
the efficient level of effort, but this can be easily achieved through an appropriate penalty
clause.19 Proposition 1 summarizes the features of the optimal contract when the re-
alization of overlap is verifiable for a court of justice. (In terms of notation, we have
ri(s) = rj(s) = r(s) and Fi = Fj = F because of symmetric treatment of licensees.)
Proposition 1 Assume that overlap is contractible. The optimal contract(
ec, F c, (qc(m), rc(m)), (qc(d), rc(d))
)
then takes the following form:
18 Although not of much relevance for the analysis, profits can be computed. They are
pi∗m =
(a− cL)2
4
pi∗d =
{
[4a(a− cH − cL) + 9(c2H + c2L)− 14cLcH ]/16 for cH < (2a+ 3cL)/5
(a− cH)∆c for cH ≥ (2a+ 3cL)/5.
19 Note that, even though it is the licensor who proposes the contract, this sort of penalty clause is in
his own best interest. In the absence of such a clause, licensees correctly anticipate that P ’s effort will be
low, and their willingness to pay is reduced accordingly.
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(i) The level of care exerted by P is ec, determined by ψ′(ec) = 2(pi∗m − pi∗d);
(ii) the fixed fee is F c = pi∗d;
(iii) when there is no overlap, output is qc(m) = q∗m and r
c(m) = pi∗m − pi∗d;
(iv) when there is overlap, output is qc(d) = q∗d and r
c(d) = 0.
This can be implemented through a royalty scheme Rcm(q) = pi
∗
m− pi∗d (independent of q) in
case of exclusivity and
Rcd(q) =
{
0 for q ≤ q∗d
∞ for q > q∗d
for the case of overlap.
Proof: The previous analysis has shown that, in the no-overlap case, the royalty scheme
should be non distortive (which is the case here because Rcm(·) doesn’t depend on output),
while in case of overlap, Lemma 2 has shown that the optimal royalty scheme should induce
q∗d (which can be achieved through quantity rationing, as in the case of R
c
d(·)). When effort
is observable, maximizing (5) leads to the first-order condition
pi∗m − pi∗d = ψ′(e)/2. (6)
Each licensee’s expected profit then is
ec
(
pi∗m − rc(m)
)
+ (1− ec)(pi∗d − rc(d)) = ec(pi∗m − (pi∗m − pi∗d))+ (1− ec)pi∗d = pi∗d,
which P extracts through the fixed fee F c. His total payoff, given by the fixed fee plus
expected royalty revenue less the cost of effort, is 2
(
pi∗d + e
c(pi∗m − pi∗d)
) − ψ(ec), i.e. the
entire aggregate surplus of the relationship.
Turning to the case where effort is unobservable, we have to show that, given the royalty
payments rc(m) and rc(d), the licensor wants to choose ec. His preferred level of effort is
obtained by solving
max
e
e rc(m) + (1− e) rc(d)− ψ(e)/2 = e(pi∗m − pi∗d)− ψ(e)/2,
the first-order condition of which is pi∗m − pi∗d = ψ′(e)/2 which coincides with (6). 
Proposition 1 says that the optimal level of effort is such that the marginal cost of
effort equals the marginal benefit of effort, the latter being given by twice (because there
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are two fields of use) the difference between monopoly and duopoly profits. The fixed fee
is equal to the duopoly profit. When there is no overlap, the licensor is rewarded through
a second fixed payment that doesn’t affect the licensees’ choice of quantity but gives him
incentives to take the appropriate care. (Alternatively, this might be achieved through a
penalty clause, as mentioned above.)
There are several reasons why licensing contracts may not include an overlap clause.
The licensor may be reluctant to insert such a clause because it may be bad news about his
ability to cleanly separate fields of use. That is, he may leave the contract incomplete for
signaling purposes, as in Spier (1992).20 Alternatively, overlap may be difficult to verify
for a court of justice, or even for the licensor himself: to establish overlap, what needs to
be proved is that a good produced by licensee i within the terms of his license competes
with one of licensee j’s products. This can be less than straightforward, especially when
the licensees have private information on market prices, as we have assumed. Moreover, as
argued by Cestone and White (2003), contracting parties may want to complement legal
incentives by financial incentives when enforcing certain clauses is expensive and highly
uncertain. For these reasons, the following sections consider the case where the license
contract cannot be contingent on overlap.
3.2 Overlap noncontractible but effort observable
We now drop the assumption that overlap can be included as a contingency in the contract.
We still assume the courts to be able to ascertain whether a product falls within the terms
of the license, but they can no longer determine whether all products that can possibly be
produced under the license serve only one of the two markets.21 Thus, when fields of use
overlap and Li sells a product in field j, the court is unable to hold the licensor responsible
for the lack of exclusivity enjoyed by Lj. When there is no overlap, meanwhile, there is no
problem because the terms of the license do not allow Li to launch a product that competes
with Lj’s.
Overlap being nonverifiable, the mechanism design problem is no longer as straightfor-
ward. Nevertheless, if we assume that all three contracting parties learn the state of the
20 Of course, this is outside of the model since we have assumed no information asymmetry with respect
to the licensor’s cost of effort.
21 In a sense, courts are unaware of consumers’ preferences: they cannot determine whether two products
are substitutes, complements or unrelated.
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world before the production stage, the fundamental result by Maskin (1977) tells us that
the first-best allocation derived in Proposition 1 is Nash implementable because it satisfies
monotonicity. And even if we assume that only the licensees learn the state of the world,
it is still possible to implement the first best through a direct revelation mechanism where
the allocation depends on both players’ messages, as we show in the Appendix. Here,
we will keep the problem interesting by restricting the set of mechanisms available to the
licensor. Specifically, we suppose that the licensor can ask the licensees to report the state
of the world, but that each licensee’s output and royalty payment can only depend on his
own report, and not on the other licensee’s message. (Nor can any other sophisticated
message game be played.) This is equivalent to having the licensor offer each licensee a
menu of contracts. By doing this, we meet a much voiced concern with implementation
theory according to which mechanisms are often excessively complex.22
Formally, we must now add incentive compatibility constraints to the problem which
make sure that it is in the licensees’ interest to choose the contract corresponding to the
underlying state of the world. In addition, we have to make sure that there is no nontruthful
equilibrium. Therefore, the licensor’s problem becomes
max
e;F ;(q(m),r(m));(q(d),r(d))
F + e r(m) + (1− e) r(d)− ψ(e)/2
subject to
F ≤ e[Πm(q(m))− r(m)]+ (1− e)[Πd(q(d), q(d))− r(d)] (7)
Πm
(
q(m)
)− r(m) ≥ Πm(q(d))− r(d) (8)
Πd
(
q(d), q(d)
)− r(d) ≥ Πd(q(m), q(d))− r(m) (9)
Πd
(
q(d), q(m)
)− r(d) ≥ Πd(q(m), q(m))− r(m). (10)
In words, the licensees must prefer reporting m when they have exclusivity, and each
licensee must prefer reporting d regardless of what the other reports when there is overlap.
From Lemma 1, we can derive the equilibrium profit of licensee i in case of overlap as a
22 See, e.g., Dewatripont (1992), who notes that “the search for positive implementation results has led
to a series of excessively sophisticated games. While there is no reason for a priori restricting the set of
acceptable mechanisms, it is of some concern that the presumed outcomes of these games rely on extremely
subtle equilibrium behavior. If one were to actually apply these games in practice, one can doubt that the
agents would play the equilibrium strategies.” Dewatripont therefore recommends constraining from the
start the set of possible games.
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function of total quantities qi and qj assuming qi ≥ ∆c ∀i:
Πd(qi, qj) =
[
a− qi+∆c
2
− qj−∆c
2
− cL
]
qi+∆c
2
+
[
a− qj+∆c
2
− qi−∆c
2
− cH
]
qi−∆c
2
=
[
a− qi+qj
2
− cL+cH
2
]
qi +
∆c2
2
. (11)
As the following lemma shows, the incentive constraints (8) and (9) severely restrict
the set of implementable allocations.
Lemma 3 When overlap is nonverifiable, a necessary and sufficient condition for any pair
of outputs
(
q(m) ≥ ∆c, q(d) ≥ ∆c) to be implementable is
q(d) ≥ q(m).
Proof: Adding up (8) and (9) and rearranging, we have
Πm
(
q(m)
)− Πm(q(d)) ≥ Πd(q(m), q(d))− Πd(q(d), q(d)).
Substituting from (2) and (11), this is
[a− q(m)− cL]q(m)− [a− q(d)− cL]q(d) ≥
[
a− q(m) + q(d)
2
− cL + cH
2
]
q(m)−
−
[
a− q(d)− cL + cH
2
]
q(d),
which, after simplification, yields(
q(d)− q(m))(q(m)−∆c) ≥ 0.
As for the sufficiency part, we now show that (10) is implied by (9) when the monotonicity
condition, q(d) ≥ q(m), holds. The constraint (10) is satisfied whenever (9) is if
Πd
(
q(d), q(m)
)− Πd(q(d), q(d)) ≥ Πd(q(m), q(m))− Πd(q(m), q(d)).
This is true if
d
dq
[Πd(q, q0)− Πd(q, q1)] > 0,
which is the case for any q0 < q1. 
The intuition for this result is related to the fact that total output in a Cournot duopoly
is higher than under monopoly. In duopoly, increasing output represents an externality:
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it reduces the price on all units, but firms only take into account the effect on their own
output.
The monotonicity condition in Lemma 3 is important because it highlights the fact
that the licensor faces a phenomenon of nonresponsiveness (Guesnerie and Laffont, 1984):
While efficiency requires q(d) < q(m) (recall Lemma 2), he can only implement output
pairs satisfying q(d) ≥ q(m). A direct implication of Lemma 3 therefore is that an upper
bound to what the licensor can achieve is to have the licensees produce the same quantity
whether or not there is overlap; we get a pooling allocation. This is not surprising since
nonresponsiveness is frequently associated with pooling of types.
How should the quantity on which to pool, q¯, be chosen? The optimal level of effort
and q¯ are, of course, interdependent: The lower the probability of overlap, the more should
licensees’ production approach q∗m. The higher production, the higher is the difference
between monopoly and duopoly profits, and the stronger are the incentives to avoid overlap.
Proposition 2 characterizes the optimal combination of effort and q¯.
Proposition 2 Assume that overlap is noncontractible and that effort is observable. Then,
the optimal license contract
(
eo, F o, (qo(m), ro(m)), (qo(d), ro(d))
)
has the following prop-
erties (assuming an interior solution):
(i) Output is the same irrespective of overlap: qo(m) = qo(d) = q¯o given by
q¯o =
1
2
[
a− (eocL + (1− eo)(cH + cL)/2)].
(ii) Effort eo satisfies ψ′(eo) = ∆c(q¯o −∆c);
(iii) the fixed fee is F o = [a− q¯o − eocL]q¯o − (1−eo)2
(
cL(q¯
o + ∆c) + cH(q¯
o −∆c)).
This can be implemented through a royalty scheme that takes the form of an output restric-
tion, that is,
R(q) =
{
0 for q ≤ q¯o
∞ for q > q¯o,
Proof: The fact that a pooling contract is optimal is a corollary of Lemma 3. Using
the fact that the ex ante participation constraint (7) binds, the optimization program
determining the level of effort and the output restriction then is
max
e,q¯
eΠm(q¯) + (1− e)Πd(q¯, q¯)− ψ(e)
2
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= e[a− q¯ − cL]q¯ + (1− e)
[
(a− q¯)q¯ − 1
2
(
cL(q¯ + ∆c) + cH(q¯ −∆c)
)]− ψ(e)
2
.
The first-order conditions are
[a− q¯ − cL]q¯ −
[
(a− q¯)q¯ − 1
2
(
cL(q¯ + ∆c) + cH(q¯ −∆c)
)]
=
ψ′(e)
2
e[a− 2q¯ − cL] + (1− e)
[
a− 2q¯ − 1
2
(cH + cL)
]
= 0
which can be simplified to the claimed expressions which together determine eo and q¯o. 
From the expression determining q¯o, it is easy to see that q¯o ∈ [q∗d, q∗m]. Moreover,
when cH > (2a+ 3cL)/5, the following argument allows us to infer that e
o must be strictly
positive. Suppose eo = 0 and thus q¯o = q∗d. Increasing e slightly generates only second-
order losses (in terms of duopoly profit, and also effort costs since, by assumption, ψ′(0) =
0) but first-order gains (in terms of monopoly profit). Thus, we have the result that
0 < eo ≤ 1, which means that, in spite of the inefficiency caused by nonresponsiveness
when overlap is noncontractible, field-of-use restrictions are still preferred to nonexclusive
licenses. Inducing the licensees to produce the optimal quantity can most easily be achieved
through an output restriction. For other distortive royalty schemes, such as a constant per-
unit royalty, monopoly output would be reduced to a level strictly below duopoly output,
which is undesirable.
3.3 Overlap noncontractible and effort unobservable
We now turn to the case where the level of care exercised by the patent holder when
drafting the field-of-use clauses is unobservable. What consequence does this have on
the optimal contract? Notice first that the patent holder has no incentive to exert effort
unless his royalty income (as opposed to the fixed fees which are paid upfront, before the
realization of overlap) depends positively on e. Thus, provision of effort is incompatible
with the bunching scheme that is optimal under observability. Of course, the licensees will
anticipate this and, if offered such a scheme, will be willing to pay only their expected
profit given e = 0 to obtain a license. Second, recall that implementability requires that
monopoly output not exceed duopoly output (Lemma 3). Hence, a scheme that induces
effort must be such that output in case of overlap is strictly greater than in the no-overlap
case. Third, the royalty payment associated with the no-overlap quantity must exceed the
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payment in case of overlap. We can thus guess that the relevant incentive constraint will
be the one for the no-overlap “type” who may be tempted to mimic the overlap “type”.
The optimization problem is
max
e;F ;(q(m),r(m));(q(d),r(d))
F + e r(m) + (1− e) r(d)− ψ(e)/2
subject to
F ≤ e∗[Πm(q(m))− r(m)]+ (1− e∗)[Πd(q(d), q(d))− r(d)](12)
Πm
(
q(m)
)− r(m) ≥ Πm(q(d))− r(d) (13)
Πd
(
q(d), q(d)
)− r(d) ≥ Πd(q(m), q(d))− r(m) (14)
Πd
(
q(d), q(m)
)− r(d) ≥ Πd(q(m), q(m))− r(m). (15)
where e∗ is the equi1librium level of effort (rationally anticipated by the licensees). Unlike
in the previous section, the menu of outputs and royalty payments now has to accomplish
two things: organizing production efficiently, and providing incentives to the licensor to
exert effort. While the problem of nonresponsiveness persists, it may now sometimes be
optimal to induce separation, precisely in order to incentivize the licensor. To do so, q(d)
must be raised above q(m), which is inefficient. Thus, the parties may accept to sacrifice
some efficiency in exchange for higher effort to avoid overlap. However, this can only be
optimal when the cost of effort is not too important (or more precisely, when it doesn’t
increase too rapidly with e, at least for small values of e). Otherwise, a bunching contract
will be preferred. Bunching, meanwhile, means that no effort can be sustained, so that the
optimal solution becomes a nonexclusive license given to both firms; that is, the license
contract no longer features field-of-use restrictions. The following proposition characterizes
the optimal contract assuming ψ(·) is such that an interior solution exists and dominates
a contract with pooling at q∗d.
Proposition 3 Assume that overlap is noncontractible and effort unobservable. Assume
also that the cost of effort, ψ(e), is sufficiently convex and that ψ(1)/2 > pi∗m − pi∗d. Then,
the optimal contract
(
eu, F u, (qu(m), ru(m)), (qu(d), ru(d))
)
has the following features:
(i) eu is defined by ψ′(eu) = 2
[
pi∗m − Πd
(
qu(d), qu(d)
)]
;
(ii) F u = eu[pi∗m − ru(m)] + (1− eu)
[
Πd
(
qu(d), qu(d)
)− ru(d)];
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(iii) qu(m) = q∗m and q
u(d) is determined by
∂e(q∗m, q(d))
∂q(d)
[
pi∗m − Πˆd(q(d))−
ψ′
(
e(q∗m, q(d))
)
2
]
+
[
1− e(q∗m, q(d))
]dΠˆd(q(d))
dq
= 0
where e(q(m), q(d)) ≡ (ψ′)−1[2(Πm(q(m))− Πm(q(d)))] and Πˆd(q) ≡ Πd(q, q).
(iv) (ru(m), ru(d)) satisfy ru(m)− ru(d) = pi∗m − Πˆd
(
qu(d)
)
.
This can be implemented with a royalty scheme R(·) which is such that R′(q∗m) = 0 and
R(q∗m) = r
u(m) while ∂Πd
(
qu(d), qu(d)
)
/∂qi = R
′(qu(d)) and R(qu(d)) = ru(d).
Proof: We proceed as follows. Based on the above discussion and earlier results, we
ignore the second incentive compatibility constraint (14) and the uniqueness condition
(15) and guess that (12) and (13) are binding. We derive the solution and then check
whether a) it satisfies the implementability condition q(d) ≥ q(m), and b) whether it
makes the licensor’s payoff higher than with the non-exclusive license (bunching) solution(
e = 0, q(m) = q(d) = q∗d
)
, which delivers a payoff of pi∗d.
Note first that equilibrium effort is determined by
r(m)− r(d) = ψ′(e)/2.
Using (13), we have
e∗ = (ψ′)−1
[
2
(
Πm(q(m))− Πm(q(d))
)] ≡ e(q(m), q(d)).
Using (12) and the fact that expectations concerning e must be correct in equilibrium, the
program becomes
max
q(m),q(d)
e(q(m), q(d))Πm(q(m)) +
[
1− e(q(m), q(d))]Πd(q(d), q(d))− ψ(e(q(m), q(d)))/2.
Letting Πˆd(q) ≡ Πd(q, q), so that dΠˆd/dq = ∂Πd/∂qi + ∂Πd/∂qj, and let em ≡ ∂e/∂q(m)
and ed ≡ ∂e/∂q(d), the first-order conditions are:
∂e
∂qm
[
Πm(q(m))− Πˆd(q(d))−
ψ′
(
e(q(m), q(d))
)
2
]
+ e(q(m), q(d))
dΠm(q(m))
dq
= 0
∂e
∂q(d)
[
Πm(q(m))− Πˆd(q(d))−
ψ′
(
e(q(m), q(d))
)
2
]
+
[
1− e(q(m), q(d))]dΠˆd(q(d))
dq
= 0.
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Noticing that ∂e
∂qm
= dΠm(q(m))/dq
ψ′′
[
(ψ′)−1
[
2
(
Πm(q(m))−Πm(q(d))
)]] , the first equation yields q(m) = q∗m.
Thus, q(m) is independent of q(d) and we can replace it in the second equation which
becomes
∂e(q∗m, q(d))
∂q(d)
[
pi∗m − Πˆd(q(d))−
ψ′
(
e(q∗m, q(d))
)
2
]
+
[
1− e(q∗m, q(d))
]dΠˆd(q(d))
dq
= 0.
Depending on the precise functional form of ψ(·), this can have several solutions, one of
which typically is a local maximum that is not implementable (i.e. smaller than q∗m), and
(at least) one a local minimum; both can be discarded. If ψ is sufficiently convex, there
also exists a local maximum to the right of q∗m, which is a candidate for the optimal q(d);
let us call it qu(d). A second candidate is a corner solution that consists in increasing
q(d) up to the point where e(q∗m, q(d)) = 1; this, however, can be the optimal q(d) only if
ψ(1)/2 ≤ pi∗m − pi∗d, which we have ruled out by assumption. Therefore, we are left with
only one candidate, qu(d), which can be shown to deliver a payoff larger than pi∗d for ψ(·)
sufficiently convex and not too large.23 
Proposition 3 shows under some assumptions on ψ(e) that, when effort is unobservable,
the optimal royalty scheme is no longer trivial and features royalties that are decreasing
with output over some range. There are a number of other interesting observations. First,
we get a variant of the well-known “no distortion at the top” result: In the absence of
overlap, the contract provides for the efficient output, q∗m. This is natural since a separating
contract aims at incentivizing the licensor. The binding incentive constraint (13) means
that effort is increasing in the difference between the no-overlap profits at q(m) and q(d).
This difference is best maximized by setting q(m) at the profit-maximizing level.
Second, there is a tradeoff between providing incentives to the licensor and producing
at the efficient scale. In fact, while raising q(d) relaxes the incentive constraint and thereby
induces greater effort, it also moves duopoly output away from the efficient level, q∗d. The
intuition for why this can be optimal is the following. Starting from q∗m, moving q(d)
upwards leads to an increase in effort and to a decrease in Πd. Because the increase in
effort is second order at q(m), while the loss in Πd is first order, this reduces the licensor’s
payoff for small deviations from q(m). However, if ψ doesn’t increase too fast, a small
difference between q(d) and q(m) translates into a large rise in effort (we are in the flat
23 Details are available from the author upon request.
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part of the cost curve). Therefore, e quickly grows sufficiently large to compensate the
losses incurred at the beginning. As q(d) continues to increase, e enters the steeper part of
the ψ curve, and eventually the negative effect on Πd again comes to outweigh the positive
effect on effort, so that the licensor’s payoff peaks at some quantity – namely, qu(d).
There are some degrees of freedom in the choice of ru(m) and ru(d). What is important
is the difference between them. The fixed fee can again be used to extract the remaining
(expected) surplus from the licensees.
4 Discussion
Two corollaries of the results obtained in the case where overlap is noncontractible and
effort is unobservable are the following. First, the licensor cannot be given incentives to
exert effort with a linear (constant per-unit) royalty. Second, if the licensor measures only
production and not sales, and there is free disposal, the monopolist licensee will produce the
duopoly quantity to pay lower royalties, and then sell only the (lower) monopoly quantity.
Thus, the above royalty scheme is not incentive compatible, implying that effort is not
sustainable in equilibrium. Since this reduces the attractiveness of using FOUR in the first
place, we might expect them to be used less when sales are hard to measure relatively to
production.
From a more general perspective, the extent to which effort is observable can be in-
terpreted as a measure of the information gap between licensor and licensees, and/or the
complexity of the patented technology. Along these lines, the model predicts that as the
technology becomes more complex, license contracts with FOUR should make greater use
of royalties.
Our results are also roughly consistent with the observation by Taylor and Silberston
(1973) and Kamien (1992) that royalty rates often decrease with output,24 at least when
these royalty rates are interpreted as average rates. Since in case of exclusivity, the royalty
payment is greater and the output lower than in case of overlap, the model predicts that
implied royalty rates per unit of output decrease with the quantity produced.25
24 Kamien (1992, p. 346) states that “in the case of licensing the sale of a new product, the patentee
often offers a lower royalty rate if sales exceed a certain prespecified level.”
25 There are, of course, alternative explanations for decreasing royalty rates. The patentee may want to
incentivize the licensee to push sales above those of other products (Kamien, 1992). Private information
on the part of licensees concerning the value of the patented technology may also lead to the observed
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To conclude, we briefly discuss some implications of our results for antitrust authori-
ties. A direct implication of the model is that quantity restrictions and non linear royalty
schemes should not be considered per se violations of the antitrust laws when used in con-
junction with FOUR. In the framework we examine, they lead to improvements in terms
of production efficiency. One qualification that needs to be made in this respect is the
possibility that FOUR may be misused to restrain competition between firms that would
otherwise be horizontal competitors. If the licensed technology represents only a minor
improvement, competition is harmed by the agreement without any offsetting benefits in
terms of higher quality. However, a simple rule that antitrust authorities could use to
determine whether an agreement is likely to be welfare-enhancing is to check whether the
licensees continue to sell the original product that does not incorporate the improved tech-
nology. In this way, if the improvement is minor, the improved product will not sell if its
price greatly exceeds the price of the original product, as they will be close substitutes.
And since the original product is supplied competitively, welfare is not likely to be harmed
by the agreement.
pattern (Beggs, 1992).
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Appendix
A direct revelation mechanism that implements first best
Assume that only the licensees learn the state of the world (i.e., the realization of overlap)
at date t = 1 of the game. Consider the following direct revelation mechanism: Both
licensees are asked to report the state of the world s. The allocation that results depends
on both licensees’ reports and is determined by the following table where each cell contains
a quadruplet (qi, ri), (qj, rj), that is, quantity-transfer pairs for licensees Li (row player)
and Lj (column player):
m d
m (q∗m, pi
∗
m − pi∗d), (q∗m, pi∗m − pi∗d) (qˆ, rˆ), (q˜, r˜)
d (q˜, r˜), (qˆ, rˆ) (q∗d, 0), (q
∗
d, 0)
Table 1: Allocations resulting from the message game
Can we find values for (qˆ, rˆ, q˜, r˜) such that truthtelling is the unique Nash equilibrium
of the game? For a truthful equilibrium to exist, it must be the case that
Πm(q
∗
m)− (pi∗m − pi∗d) ≥ Πm(q˜)− r˜ (16)
Πd(q
∗
d, q
∗
d) ≥ Πd(qˆ, q˜)− rˆ. (17)
Moreover, in order not to get a nontruthful equilibrium, the following constraints must be
satisfied:
Πm(q
∗
d) < Πm(qˆ)− rˆ (18)
Πd(q
∗
m, q
∗
m) < Πd(q˜, qˆ)− r˜. (19)
Let us set qˆ = q∗d + ε, where ε is arbitrarily small, and rˆ = 0. This satisfies (18), and
also ensures that (17) is satisfied for any q˜ ≥ q∗d. Adding up the remaining two constraints
(16) and (19), and noting that Πm(q
∗
m) = pi
∗
m and Πd(q
∗
d, q
∗
d) = pi
∗
d, we obtain the following
condition:
Πm(q˜)− pi∗d ≤ r˜ < Πd(q˜, q∗d)− Πd(q∗m, q∗m).
For such an r˜ to exist, it must be the case that, for some q˜ ≥ q∗d,
Πm(q˜)− Πd(q˜, q∗d) < pi∗d − Πd(q∗m, q∗m).
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The right-hand side of this expression is necessarily strictly positive. Thus, it suffices to
find a q˜ such that
Πm(q˜) = Πd(q˜, q
∗
d). (20)
We show that such a q˜ exists for the case cH < (2a+ 3cL)/5, i.e., where both licensees are
involved in production. Solving (20), we obtain
q˜ = (2a+ 3cH − 5cL +
√
A)/8,
where A = (2a + 11cH − 13cL)(2a + 3cH − 5cL). Given our assumptions, A is sure to be
positive, and thus q˜ exists.
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